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Strangers among us  
Non-governmental organisations in Russia 
Katarzyna Chawryło, Maria Domańska
The situation of the third sector in Russia, i.e. the civil society structures independent from 
the state, is worsening on a regular basis. The Kremlin’s actions aimed at paralysing and de-
stroying the independent non-governmental sector seen over the past four years have been 
presented as part of a struggle for the country’s sovereignty. This is above all a consequence 
of the Russian government’s efforts to take full control of the socio-political situation in the 
country while it also needs to deal with the geopolitical confrontation with the West and 
the worsening economic crisis.
The policy aimed against non-governmental organisations is depriving the public of structu-
res for self-organisation, protection of civil rights and the means of controlling the ever more 
authoritarian government. At the same time, the Kremlin has been depriving itself of chan-
nels of co-operation and communication with the public and antagonising the most active 
citizens. The restrictive measures the Kremlin has taken over the past few years with regard 
to NGOs prove that Russian decision-makers believe that any social initiative independent of 
the government may give rise to unrest, which is dangerous for the regime, and – given the 
economic slump – any unrest brings unnecessary political risk.
The Russian government  
vs. the third sector
The 1990s were a time of intensive development 
of non-governmental organisations in Russia. 
However, the conditions for NGO development 
deteriorated when Vladimir Putin became pre-
sident – a number of legal restrictions linked to 
their operation were introduced at that time. 
After Putin’s two terms in office, the period of 
Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency (2008-2012) be-
came a time of relative prosperity for NGOs in 
Russia. The more liberal atmosphere in socio
-political life and Russia’s greater openness to 
international contacts allowed the third sector 
to develop at an appreciable rate. Human ri-
ghts organisations independent from the go-
vernment, e.g. Agora and Memorial, which are 
respected in international circles, were at that 
time very active. Charity organisations, such as 
Podari Zhizn Foundation (Gift of Life) or Dr. Liza 
Glinka’s aid initiatives, gained in popularity. Their 
effectiveness and increasing public prestige allo-
wed them to receive support from the Kremlin. 
A number of grassroots civil movements which 
were formed to combat the government’s abu-
se of power emerged at that time in Russia (for 
example, the Association of Russian Drivers, the 
movement for the protection of Khimki forest 
near Moscow). Their mobilisation was facilitated 
by the popularisation of the Internet. These rapi-
dly developing structures also included indepen-
dent organisations whose goal was to protect 
voters’ rights (such as Golos (Vote), Grazhdanin 
Nablyudatel (The Citizen on Watch)), which were 
able to mobilise thousands of volunteers to ob-
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serve the parliamentary election in 2011 and the 
presidential election in 2012. 
Putin’s new presidency marked a turning po-
int in the Russian government’s policy on the 
third sector. The 2011 election was accompa-
nied by massive demonstrations against elec-
toral fraud and in the Kremlin’s opinion it was 
non-governmental organisations – on which 
the government had loosened its grip – who 
stirred up dissatisfaction among Russians and 
facilitated the protests. As a result, starting 
from spring 2012, the government became 
more and more engaged in combating inde-
pendent NGOs, viewing their operation as the 
main threat to their interests. Repressive me-
asures intensified in 2014–2015, as Russia’s 
international position was deteriorating and 
the economic crisis was becoming ever worse. 
At present, the Kremlin is making efforts to re-
move independent NGOs from the Russian pu-
blic sphere, the very same NGOs which make the 
struggle for citizens’ collective interests possible 
and build a sense of solidarity and civic aware-
ness. The government wants to deprive citizens 
of basic knowledge of civil rights and freedoms 
together with the methods for protecting them. 
Its aim is also to disassemble the institutional fra-
meworks for possible public protests in order to 
maintain the present political system and streng-
then its social legitimacy despite the deteriorating 
socio-economic situation within the country. The 
Kremlin wants to cut off independent channels for 
financing even strictly apolitical activity of NGOs 
and to establish a governmental monopoly on ci-
tizens’ engagement and participation in the pu-
blic sphere. Even organisations involved in scien-
tific and educational activity are being repressed 
(independent education is often presented by the 
government as ‘subversive activity’). Depriving 
the public of sources of information and an edu-
cation system autonomous from the state serves 
to prevent the possibility of educating indepen-
dent-minded citizens and to block the emergence 
of potential counter-elites.
Methods of combating non-governmental 
organisations
The opportunities and threats to the present 
government system are subjectively evaluated 
by the ruling elite who arbitrarily decide which 
instruments will be chosen to protect their inte-
rests. The government has waged a campaign 
against the third sector using both indirect and 
direct methods. The former are based on an ag-
gressive propaganda aimed at consolidating the 
public around the government, discrediting inde-
pendent NGOs and discouraging the public from 
foreign contacts as a possible source of models 
for democratic and civil activity. The latter refer to 
repressive measures targeted against selected or-
ganisations and activists, and limiting the area of 
their operation. All of them are expected to sup-
press not only manifestations of active opposition 
but also any independent public-civil activity. 
In the context of the geopolitical confrontation 
with the West, the Russian government has 
been making efforts with the help of media 
propaganda to paint a black-and-white picture 
of the world and to entrench a confrontational 
vision of social relations in the Russian collective 
consciousness. This message is based on what 
might be described as a besieged fortress syn-
drome and the myth of the enemy, reinforced 
through the militarisation of rhetoric – the latter 
is designed to shock the audience by presenting 
tensions in relations with the West as being of 
a quasi-military nature. It clearly emphasises the 
link between external enemies (the United Sta-
tes and the EU – to a lesser extent), allegedly 
intending to dismember the Russian state, and 
internal enemies, i.e. the ‘fifth column’ who are 
allegedly paid by the West to provoke a ‘colo-
The Kremlin’s actions are aimed at elim-
inating independent NGOs from the Rus-
sian public sphere.
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ured revolution’ in Russia. The role of the ‘traitor 
of the nation’1 is attributed primarily to non-go-
vernmental organisations. They allegedly repre-
sent the interests of foreign countries and im-
pose values which are contrary to the Russian 
idealized tradition and morality on which ‘Rus-
sia’s sovereign order and power’ are based. 
Struggle with NGOs is often conducted with 
the help of intentionally vague legal acts which 
allow discretionary interpretation. The most 
important of these, covering all areas of ope-
ration of the third sector and in fact providing 
means to ban or paralyse any organisation are: 
the ‘foreign agents’ act of 20122 and the act on 
‘undesirable organisations’ of 20153. The con-
struction of these acts offers broad room for 
manoeuvre to civil servants and officers of law 
enforcement agencies of various ranks, who 
are encouraged to compete with each other in 
1 It is worth noting Vladimir Putin’s statement during 
an FSB meeting in March 2015, when he directly ac-
cused non-governmental organisations of acting upon 
instruction from Western secret services planning to 
destabilise Russia ahead of the elections in 2016 and 
2018. Путин рассказал коллегии ФСБ о правильной 
оппозиции, 26 March 2015, http://www.bbc.com/
russian/russia/2015/03/150326_putin_fsb_opposition. 
Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Security Council, 
also warned in March that “nationalist and revanchist” 
Finnish organisations were trying to influence people of 
Karelia, using local NGOs: Патрушев объявил о росте 
влияния финских националистов и реваншистов 
в Карелии, 19 March 2015, http://www.newsru.com/
russia/19mar2015/patrushev.html. Three months lat-
er, Putin accused “foreign and network organisations” 
of taking away (“sucking out”) school children from 
Russia under the guise of foreign educational pro-
grammes: Путин: надо обратить внимание на работу 
иностранных НКО в школах, 24 June 2015, http://ria.
ru/society/20150624/1084949791.html#ixzz3i8YevKqN.
2 The amendment of the act on non-commercial organisa-
tions of July 2012 imposed on Russian non-profit organi-
sations financed by foreign entities and at the same time 
engaged in ‘political activity’ the obligation to accept 
the ‘foreign agent’ status. Leaving aside the discrediting 
epithet ‘agent’, the definition of political activity in this 
act is very extensive and imprecise, and – as the practical 
implementation of the act has proven – the only real cri-
terion for qualifying organisations as ‘agents’ is foreign 
financial and material support. As of 31 July 2015, 83 
Russian organisations are on the list of the Ministry of 
Justice (http://unro.minjust.ru/NKOForeignAgent.aspx).
3 Maria Domańska, ‘The law on ‘undesirable’ organisa-
tions: Russia deepens its self-isolation, 27 May 2015, 
OSW Analyses, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publik-
acje/analyses/2015-05-27/law-undesirable-organisa-
tions-russia-deepens-its-self-isolation
manifesting eagerness and loyalty to the Krem-
lin. This is becoming particularly important at 
a time of the economic crisis and staff reduc-
tions in the state administration, and also 
ahead of local and parliamentary elections. 
Furthermore, even though state administration 
agencies have numerous legal instruments at 
their disposal, they often disregard or openly 
violate legal regulations4, including the non-re-
troactivity principle5. The blurring of the boun-
daries between legal and illegal operation is 
intended to discourage citizens from becoming 
engaged in the activities of civil society and to 
paralyse existing organisations with inspec-
tions6, tying them up in court procedures and 
imposing administrative penalties on them7. Ad-
ditionally, more and more postulates to impose 
new restrictions on the third sector are made8. 
4 Contrary to regulations of the act on ‘foreign agents’, or-
ganisations active in the area of science (such as the Dy-
nasty foundation), culture, healthcare, welfare, ecology 
and charity, and even those which co-operated with public 
administration bodies (for example, with the presidential 
Human Rights Council, as was in the case of Pavel Chikov, 
the head of Agora), have also been branded ‘agents’. 
5 One of the branches of Golos organisation, an election 
watchdog, has been put on the list of ‘agents’ after it 
received a grant from USAID before the law came into 
effect – the real intention was to eliminate Golos from 
watching elections.
6 The most spectacular was the massive control of almost 
one hundred NGOs in spring 2013 under the pretext of 
combating extremism. 
7 See Katarzyna Jarzyńska, ‘Kreml „porządkuje” trzeci 
sektor’, 10 April 2013, OSW Analyses, http://www.osw.
waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2013-04-10/kreml-porzad-
kuje-trzeci-sektor
8 See, for example, the statement from the deputy min-
ister of justice Sergei Gerasimov, who appealed for of-
fering state agencies broader competences as regards 
control over NGOs in order to streamline revealing 
the channels of financing opposition forces in Rus-
sia. Минюст рассказал о  посредниках «иностранных 
агентов», 3 July 2015, https://slon.ru/posts/53612
Intentionally vague legal acts which al-
low discretionary interpretation are often 
employed in direct struggle with non- 
-governmental organisations.
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Along with the arbitrary application of laws and 
repressive measures conducted by law enforce-
ment agencies, mechanisms for administering 
justice outside the law are being created. They 
are based on ‘public control’ (which is suppo-
sed to serve as a tool of supervision parallel to 
the legal procedures) and ‘public judgement’ 
(tracking and stigmatising ‘enemies’ and pro-
tecting ‘vital interests of the state’). One exam-
ple of such practices was when the Federation 
Council (the upper house of Russian parliament) 
adopted the so-called ‘patriotic stop-list’ in July 
2015: a list of foreign non-governmental orga-
nisations whose activity in the Council’s opinion 
posed a threat to Russia’s internal security9. The 
Prosecutor General’s Office applied the act on 
‘undesirable organisations’ for the first time la-
ter in July, when it placed the American organi-
sation National Endowment for Democracy on 
the stop-list. Such practices pose the risk that 
the distinction between legal regulations and 
‘moral and patriotic’ standards which the Krem-
lin refers to in an attempt to garner stronger 
public support will fade away completely. At the 
same time, the public received a clear message 
that the government expects the organisations 
and citizens not only to cut off foreign contacts 
by themselves10 but also to actively co-opera-
te with state authorities in order to spot such 
9 See Katarzyna Chawryło, Maria Domańska, ‘Organizacje za-
graniczne na celowniku Kremla’, 15 July 2015, OSW Analyses, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2015-07-15/
organizacje-zagraniczne-na-celowniku-kremla
10 According to Konstantin Kosachev, the head of the foreign 
affairs commission of the Federation Council, the ‘patriotic 
stop-list’ is a kind of a ‘warning’ to Russian organisations 
(http://council.gov.ru/press-center/news/57126/).
‘undesirable activity’11. This approach inevitably 
leads to polarisation, atomisation and the de-
struction of non-governmental circles. 
In parallel with this, the government has made 
efforts to take control over the third sector’s 
activity via the system of state grants. These 
are sometimes offered to carefully selected, 
effective NGOs active in welfare sphere: sup-
porting their operation is supposed to boost 
the Kremlin’s image in the eyes of the society 
(as in the case of the Gift of Life Foundation). 
Entities dependent on governmental funds are 
often used for political purposes. Grants are 
also frequently offered to organisations with 
patriotic and nationalist profiles engaged in 
pro-Kremlin propaganda (for example, the Ni-
ght Wolves motorcycle club allied to President 
Putin). Furthermore, the government has also 
employed the practice of replacing effective 
independent organisations with those contro-
lled top-down: so-called GONGOs (governmen-
t-organised ‘non-governmental organisations’). 
Their operation is used above all to distribute 
funds within the public support base loyal to 
the Kremlin or to carry out political tasks12.
The third sector  
as viewed by the Russian public
The propaganda campaigns waged against 
NGOs fall on fertile ground in Russia. This is 
mainly because most citizens indiscriminately 
accept what the most popular Kremlin-con-
trolled mass media (especially television, their 
11 Andrey Klishas, a deputy of the Federation Council, has stated 
that “Russian civil society should know how (…) to avoid con-
cealed influence of foreign countries” (http://council.gov.ru/
press-center/news/57126/), and deputy minister Valeri Gera-
simov has appealed to the public to help detect ‘undesirable’ 
organisations (Минюст РФ призвал россиян «сигналить» 
о «нежелательных» НКО, 3 July 2015, http://www.znak.
com/urfo/news/2015-07-03/1042292.html
12 For example, the expert-analyst foundation Institute of 
Socio-Economic and Political Studies (ISEPI) established 
upon the Kremlin’s initiative or the Safe Internet League 
(an organisation lobbying for stricter state control in the 
Internet; it was founded by Marshall Capital Partners, 
a company established by Konstantin Malofeev, a business-
man with close links to the Kremlin).
Along with the arbitrary application of 
laws and repressive measures by law en-
forcement agencies, mechanisms for ad-
ministering justice outside the law based 
on ‘public control’ are being created.
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main source of information about the world) 
say about the operation of NGOs in Russia13. Pe-
ople believe what is said about NGOs because 
few of them have direct contact with non-go-
vernmental organisations, and for this reason 
their chances of forming independent opinions 
about these organisations remain limited. Only 
5% of respondents say they have NGO wor-
kers among their friends14, and only 16% of 
Russian citizens know precisely what functions 
non-governmental organisations perform15.
The general level of trust and self-organisation 
is very low among the Russian public – for most 
Russians the particular needs of their narrow 
family circles are much more important than 
the interests of a social group. This mindset 
became entrenched in the Soviet period, when 
any civil activity was strictly regulated by the 
government, and commonplace denunciations 
and repression from the state authorities led to 
the disintegration of elementary social bonds 
which turned out impossible to rebuild. The 
Kremlin skilfully employs this legacy in its rhe-
toric, making citizens fearful and suspicious of 
NGOs and convinced that civil activity is ineffi-
cient and entails high personal risk. In effect, 
13 TV coverages broadcast on the major Russian TV channels, 
accusing NGOs of subversive activity following instruc-
tions from the USA( for example, in the popular news pro-
gramme hosted by Dmitry Kiselyov), have had a devastating 
effect on the perception of NGOs in Russia. See for exam-
ple https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=myAl7m0Mh0c
14 Levada Centre Report, http://www.levada.ru/books/potentsi-
al-grazhdanskogo-uchastiya-v-reshenii-sotsialnykh-problem
15 Levada Centre Survey, http://www.levada.ru/11-07-2013/
otnoshenie-k-nko
over 50% of Russians believe that organisations 
engaged in political issues which receive finan-
cial support from abroad and do not register 
themselves as ‘foreign agents’ should face 
sanctions or even be banned16.
The lack of support for the operation of NGOs 
among the Russian public also stems from the 
scarce knowledge of the role the third sector 
plays within the democratic system. In the opi-
nion of most Russians, the highest and often 
the only entities capable of protecting their 
rights are state institutions, above all the pre-
sident, who is the personification of the sta-
te. The Kremlin government has intentionally 
made efforts to entrench this mindset. Thus, 
Russians in general are unaware of the fact that 
eliminating NGOs from Russia would adversely 
affect the poorest and the most vulnerable so-
cial groups, as their activity might compensate 
for increasing dysfunctionality of the state in 
the welfare sector, and might help to protect 
citizens from ever more repressive state admi-
nistration. 
Survival strategies adopted 
by non-governmental organisations
The new legal environment, the implementa-
tion of restrictive legal acts and the deteriora-
tion of the socio-political climate in Russia have 
led to the paralysing of a significant number of 
independent NGOs and outright disintegration 
of independent non-governmental circles. Only 
a few organisations have been able to adapt 
themselves to the new situation, but even they 
operate under constant pressure and with the 
awareness that they may face inspections and 
repression at any time. One consequence of the 
NGO witch-hunt in the media are the problems 
they have with everyday functioning – they 
experience difficulties in tfinding an office for 
rent, settling administrative matters or finding 
associates, because intimidated citizens are 
16 Ibid.
The propaganda campaigns waged 
against NGOs fall on fertile ground in 
Russia. In the opinion of most Russians, 
the highest  entities capable of protecting 
protecting their rights are state institu-
tions, above all the president.
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afraid of establishing contacts with the ‘ene-
mies’. The Russian government has managed 
to instil the self-censorship reflex into part of 
the non-governmental circles and the public in 
general, as well as a fear of civil activity and fo-
reign contacts. This additionally aggravates the 
polarisation and isolation of the third sector in 
Russia, contributing thus to strengthening the 
authoritarian government system.
Some organisations, after receiving prior admo-
nition in connection with the ‘foreign agents’ 
act, decided to reject foreign financial sup-
port, and thus avoided being put on the list of 
‘agents’, yet now they find it much more diffi-
cult to operate. Those which have been able to 
find additional funding sources continue their 
work, for example the Levada Centre which de-
als with public opinion research in Russia (the 
program for surveying pre-election sentiments 
in Moscow, sponsored by the US-based NED has 
been closed, but domestic funds, including go-
vernment grants17, have allowed it to continue 
the other programmes18). Others have changed 
their names and ways of operating, which at 
least temporarily allows them to act, albeit in 
a restricted form (for example, the Moscow 
School of Political Studies, now known as the 
Moscow School of Civil Education). 
Some organisations, despite being on the list, 
are making efforts to continue operation and 
to be removed from the ministerial stop-list, 
for example, the Russian Memorial and the 
Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers, 
which helps soldiers and their families and is 
the best-recognised non-governmental orga-
nisation among citizens19. Characteristically, 
17 The Levada Centre received a presidential grant of 
5 million roubles in 2014 (http://rbcdaily.ru/soci-
ety/562949991750668) and 1.4 million roubles in the 
first grant competition in 2015 (http://www.vedomo-
sti.ru/politics/articles/2015/07/02/598933-krupneish-
ie-prezidentskie-granti-poluchili-proekti-patriotich-
eskoi-napravlennosti).
18 Interview with Lev Gudkov, 30 July 2015, http://www.
golos-ameriki.ru/content/article/2886469.html
19 According to data from the Levada Centre, 82% Russians 
have heard about their activity. 
some members of Union started being subjec-
ted to pressure when its activists began to inve-
stigate into cases of deaths of Russian soldiers 
fighting on the separatists’ side in Ukraine. 
Some organisations branded as ‘foreign 
agents’ wound up their activity (in protest at 
being labelled as ‘spies’), for example, the re-
spected Dynasty foundation, which financed 
the development of science in Russia. When 
the organisation was placed on the ‘agent’ list 
and subsequently liquidated, this provoked 
demonstrations of protest in academic circles, 
since the support offered by it to talented re-
searchers will not be replaced with budgetary 
funds for education20. 
Only a handful of organisations have been able 
to successfully appeal against court decisions, 
for example Golos, which has been removed 
from the list of agents. However, the structures 
and the image of this organisation have been 
adversely affected to such an extent that it will 
not be able to resume its operation on the pre-
vious scale. Furthermore, sanctions have not 
been lifted from regional branches of this or-
ganisation21.
20 For the 13 years of its operation in Russia, the Dynas-
ty foundation allocated over 2 billion roubles towards 
supporting education and the popularisation of science. 
Rumours that it supported the opposition activist Alexei 
Navalny might have served as a reason for putting pres-
sure on this organisation. 
21 For example, the Golos – Privolzhye organisation was 
branded a ‘foreign agent’, and its head was punished with 
a severe fine. The official reason for putting it on the list of 
agents was the fact that the book Is free election possible 
in Russia and the report titled Putin. Corruption developed 
by oppositionists were found in the organisation’s office, 
which was recognised as political activity. 
At present, virtually all independent 
non-governmental organisations encoun-
ter serious problems in operation.
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Conclusions
In the present situation, virtually all indepen-
dent non-governmental organisations encoun-
ter serious problems in operation. The intentio-
nal discrediting and stigmatising of NGOs and 
the ongoing increase in the cost of civil activity 
is likely to mean that fewer and fewer people 
will be willing to become involved in having any 
contacts with non-governmental organisations. 
Thus, the isolation and degradation of the third 
sector in Russia will only get worse. 
It appears that the government’s stance on the 
third sector may evolve in the future, depen-
ding on such factors as the development of the 
domestic economic situation and the quality of 
Russia’s international relations. The expected 
long-term stagnation and the related socio-po-
litical risks are likely to make the government’s 
repressive policy more entrenched, since NGOs 
are treated as a potential hotbed of public un-
rest. Given the deterioration of conditions in 
the social sector (partly due to budget cuts), 
the Kremlin will even increase its forethought 
in this area. Nevertheless, the government may 
also allow selected organisations to perform 
certain social functions under strict govern-
mental supervision in order to alleviate tension 
caused by welfare problems22. Since the Krem-
lin’s policy with regard to NGOs co-operating 
with foreign partners is correlated with its rela-
tions with the West, it cannot be ruled out that 
the normalisation of these relations will make 
the Kremlin slightly less determined in stigma-
tising non-governmental organisations. Howe-
ver, given the present political system in Russia, 
the government’s co-operation with the third 
sector is unlikely to become normalised. 
22 In August 2015, increased support was promised for 
non-governmental organisations involved in welfare is-
sues. Vyacheslav Volodin, deputy head of the Presidential 
Administration, made a statement regarding this issue. 
Кремль оценит регионы по НКО, 10 August 2015, http://
znak.com/moscow/articles/10-08-10-02/104283.html
